s 







FOR THE PEOPLE 



S' 



T H E 



tl 



PKIVATE LETTERS 



LIEUT.-GENERAL SCOTT, 



AND THE REPLY OF 



EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN. 



NEW YORK: 

HAMILTON, JOHNSON, & FARRELLY, PUBLISHERS, 

No. 22 Ann Strbet. 
1862. 

Frt.-uh & Wheat, J'rinlers, 18 Ann St., N. Y, 



THE 



PRIVATE LETTERS 



LIEUT.-GENERAL SCOTT, 



EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S 



HEPLY 



NEW YORK: 

HAMILTON, JOHNSON & FARRELLY, PUBLISHERS, 

No. 22 Ann Street. 
1862. 






Early in the year 1861, when civil war seemed impending but had not actually 
broken out, Gen. Scott, then at the head of the army, wrote two papers containing 
Ms views, professional and political, on the crisis, and the rights and duties which 
devolved on the Government in the momentous conjuncture. These two papers were 
subsequently lent to many friends to read, and one of them has recently been pub- 
lished, without the writer's consent. Therefore, the Old "Warrior has deemed it proper 
to give to the public himself the second of the papers referred to, lest it also might 
find its unauthorized way into print. He has, therefore, forwarded it to the National 
Intelligencer, having added to it a few explanatory " notes," which the lapse of time 
seemed to render proper. 

The paper now submitted to the public by Gen. Scott throws a flood of light on 
the history of the rebellion in its incipient stages, and will inspire every reader with 
deep interest. It establishes, in the first place, the patriotic anxiety of the wise and 
watchful General-in-Chief to prepare for the coming storm, and his earnest and re- 
peated efforts to preva,il on the G overnment to garrison and secure the Southern 
forts against every possible attack. This paper must have the effect, with every 
candid mind, of vindicating the character of the illustrious veteran General himself 
from imputations with which he has been assailed. 



GENERAL SCOTT'S LETTEllS, 



October 30, 1860, I emphatically called the attention of the Pre- 
sident to the necessity of strong garrisons in all the forts below the 
principal commercial cities of the Southern States, including, by 
name, the forts in Pensacola harbor. October 31, I suggested to 
the Secretary of War that a circular should be sent at once to such 
of those forts as had garrisons to be on the alert against surprises 
and sudden assaults. — (See my Views, since 'pTinted.) 

After a long confinement to my bed in New York, I came to this 
city (Washington) December 12. Next day I personally urged up- 
on the Secretary of War the same views, viz : strong garrisons in 
the Southern forts — those of Charleston and Pensacola harbors, at 
once ; those of Mobile Bay and the Mississippi, below New Orleans, 
next, &c. I again pointed out the organized companies and the re- 
cruits at the principal depots available for the purpose. The Secre- 
tary did not concur in any of my views, when I begged him to 
procure for me an early interview with the President, that I might 
make one effort more to save the forts and the Union. 

By appointment, the Secretary accompanied me to the President, 
December 15, when the same topics, secessionism, &c., were again 
pretty fully discussed. There being at the moment [in the opinion 
of the President] no danger of an early secession, beyond South 
Carolina, the President, in reply to my arguments for immediately 
reinforcing Fort Moultrie and sending a garrison to Fort Sumter, 
said : 

" The time had not arrived for doing so ; that he should wait the 
action of the Convention of South Carolina, in the expectation that 
a commission would be appointed and sent to negotiate with him and 
Congress respecting the secession of the State and the property of 
the United States held within its limits ; and, that if Congress 
should decide against the secession, then he would send a reinforce- 
ment and telegraph the commanding officer (jMajor Anderson) of 
Fort Moultrie to hold the forts (Moultrie and Sumter) against 
attack." 



4 GENERAL SCOTT'S LETTERS. 

And the Secretary, with animation, added : 

" We have a vessel of war (the Brooklyn) held in readiness at Nor- 
folk, and he would then send three hundred men in her from Fort 
Monroe to Charleston." 

To which I replied, first, that so manj^ men could not be with- 
drawn from that garrison, but could be taken from New York, 
Next, that it would then be too late, as the South Carolina Com- 
missioners would have the game in their hands, b}^ first using and 
then cutting the wires ; that as there was not a soldier in Fort Sum- 
ter, any handful of armed secessionists might seize and occupy it 
&c., &c. 

Here the remark may be permitted that if the Secretary's three 
hundred men had then, or some time later, been sent to Forts Moul- 
trie and Sumter, lyotli would now have been in the possession of the 
United States, and not a battery below them could have been 
erected by the secessionists ; consequently the access to those forts 
from the sea would now (the end of March) be unobstructed and 
free* 

The same day. December 15, I wrote the following note : 

"Lieut. Gen. Scott begs the President to pardon him for supply- 
ing, in this note, what he omitted to say this morning at the inter- 
view with which he was honored hy the President. 

"Long prior to the force hill,, (March 2d, 1833,) ^^rior to the issue 
of his proclamation, and in y&.rt prior to the passage of the ordinance 
of nullification, President Jackson, under the act of March 3, 1807, 
'authorizing the employment of the land and naval forces,' caused 
reinforcements to be sent to Fort Moultrie, and a sloop-of-war, (the 
Natchez,) with two revenue cutters, to be sent to Charleston har- 
bor, in order, 1, to prevent the seizure of that fort by the nullifiers, 
and 2, to enforce the execution of the revenue- laws. Gen. Scott 
himself arrived at Charleston the day after the passage of the ordi- 
nance of nullification, and many of the additional companies were 
then en route for the same destination. 

" President Jackson familiarly said at the time ' that, by the 
assemblage of those forces, for lawful purposes, he m^^s not making 

*" The plan invented by Gen. Scott to stop secesssion was, like all campaigns 
devised by him, very able in its details, and nearly certain of general snccess. The 
Southern States are full of arsenals and forts, commanding their rivers and strategic 
points. Gen. Scott desired to transfer the army of the L^nited States to these forts as 
speedily and as quietly as possible. The Southern States could not cut of communica- 
tion between the Government and the fortresses without a great fleet, which they can- 
not build for years, or take them by land without one hundi'ed thousand men, many 
hundred millions of dollars, several campaigns, and many a bloody siege. Had Gen- 
eral Scott been able to have got these forts m the condition he desii'ed them to be, the 
Southern Confederacy would not now esdat."— Part of the euloyi/ pronounced on Secre- 
tary Floyd {who defeated ScotVs plans) hy the Richmond Examiner^ on Floyd's reception 
nt that city. 



GENERAL SCOTT'S LETTERS. 5 

war upon South Carolina ; but that if South Carolina attacked them, 
it would be South Carolina that made war upon the United States.' 

" Gen. S., who received his first instructions (oral) from the Pre- 
sident, in the temporary absence of the Secretary of War, (Gen. 
Cass,) remembers those expressions well. 

" Scitnrday night, December 15, 1860." 

_^ December 28. — Again, after Major Anderson had gallantly and 
wisely thrown his handful of men from Fort Moultrie into Fort 
Sumter — learning that, on demand of South Carolina, there was 
great danger he might be ordered by the Secretary back to the less 
tenable work, or out of the harbor — I wrote this note : 

" Lieut. Gen. Scott (who has had a bad night, and can scarcely 
hold up his head this morning) begs to express the hope to the 
Secretary of War — 1. That orders may not be given for the evacu- 
ation of Fort Sumter. 2. That one hundred and fifty recruits may 
instantly be sent from Governor's Island to reinforce that garrison, 
with ample supplies of ammunition and subsistence, including fresh 
vegetables, as potatoes, onions, turnips 
armed vessels be sent to support the said fort. 

" Lieut. Gen. S. avails himself of this opportunity also to express 
the hope that the recommendations heretofore made by him to the 
Secretary of War respecting Forts Jackson, St. Philip, Morgan, and 
Pulaski, and particuUirh^ in respect to Forts Pickens and McRae, 
and the Pensacola Navy Yard, in connection with the last two 
named works, may be reconsidered by the Secretary. 

" Lieut. Gen. S. will further ask the attention of the Secretary 
to Forts Jefferson and Taylor, which are wholly national — being of 
far greater value even to the most distant points of the Atlantic 
coast and the people on the upper waters of the Missouri, Missis- 
sippi, and Ohio rivers than to the State of Florida. There is only 
a feeble company at Key West for the defence of Fort Taylor, and 
not a soldier in Fort Jefferson to resist a handful of fillibusters, or 
a row-boat of pirates ; and the Gulf, soon after the beginning of 
secession or revolutionary troubles in the adjacent States, will 
swarm with such nuisances,"* 

December 30. — I addressed the President again, as follows : 

" Lieutenant General Scott begs the President of the United 
States to pardon the irregularity of this communication. It is 
Sunday, the weather is bad, and General S. is not well enough to 
go to church. 

♦ It was not till January 4 that, by the aid of Secretary Holt, (a strong and 
loyal man,) I obtained permission to send succor to the feeble garrison of Fort Taylor, 
Key West, and at the same time a company— Major Arnold's, from Boston — to occupy 
Fort Jefferson, Tortugas Island. If this company had been three days later, the fort 
would have been prc-occupied by Floridians. It is known that the rebels had their 
eyes upon those powerful forts, which govern the commerce of the Mexican Gulf, as 
Gibraltar and Malta govern that of the Mediterranean. With Forts Jefferson and 
Taylor, the rebels might have purchased an early European recognition. 



S GENEKAL SCOTT'S LETTERS. 

" But matters of the highest natiorial importance seem to forbid 
a moment's delay, and, if misled by zeal, he hopes for the Presi- 
dent's forgiveness. 

"Will the President permit General S., without reference to the 
"War Department, and otherwise as secretly as possible, to send two 
hundred and fifty recruits from New York harbor to reinforce Fort 
Sumter, together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition, 
and subsistence ? 

" It is hoped that a sloop of war and cutter may be ordered for 
the sam.e purpose as early as to-morrow. 

" General S. will wait upon the President at any moment he may 
be called for." 

The South Carolina Commissioners had already been many days 
in Washington, and no movement of defence (on the part of the 
United States) was permitted. 

I will here close my notice of Fort Sumter by quoting from some 
of my previous reports. 

It would have been easy to reinforce this fort down to about the 
12th of February. In this long delay Fort Moultrie had been re- 
armed and greatly strengthened in every wa}^ by the rebels. ^Many 
powerful new land batteries (besides a formidable raft) have been 
constructed. Hulks, too, have been sunk in the principal channel 
so afi to render access to Fort Sumter from the sea impracticable 
without first carrying all the lower batteries of the secessionists. 
The difficulty of reinforcing has thus been increased ten or twelve 
fold. First, the late President refused to allow any attempt to be 
made because he was holding negotiations with the South Carolina 
Commissioners. 

Afterwards, Secretary Holt and myself tried, in vain, to obtain a 
ship of war for the purpose, and were finally obliged to employ the 
passenger-steamer " Star of the West." That vessel, but for the 
hesitation of the master, might, as is generall^^ believed, have de- 
livered at the fort the men and subsistence on board. This attempt 
at succor failing, I next, verbally, submitted to the late Cabinet 
either that succor be sent by ships of war, fighting their way by 
the batteries, (increasing in strength daily,) or that Major Anderson 
should be left to ameliorate his condition by the muzzles of his 
guns — that is, enforcing supplies by bombardment and by hringing 
to merchant vessels, helping himself, (giving orders for payment,) or, 
finally, be allowed to evacuate the fort, which, in that case, would 
be inevitable. 

But, before any resolution was taken, the late Secretary of the 



GENERAL SCOTT'S LETTERS. 7 

Navy making diflSculties about the want of suitable war vessels, 
another Commissioner from South Carolina arrived, causing further 
delay. When this had pas.'^ed away Secretaries Holt and Toucey, 
Captain Ward, of the Navy, and myself — with the knowledge of 
the President (Buchanan) — settled upon the employment, under the 
Captain, (who was eager for the expedition,) of three or four small 
steamers belonging to the Coast Survey. At that time (late in 
Januar}') I have but little doubt Captain Ward would have reached 
Fort Sumter, with all his vessels. But he was kept back by some- 
thing like a truce or armistice, [made here] embracing Charleston 
and Pensacola harbors, agreed upon between the late President and 
certain principal seceders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, &c., 
and this truce lasted to the end of that Administration. 

That plan and all others, without a squadron of war ships and a 
considerable army — competent to take and hold the many formida- 
ble batteries below Fort Sumter, and before the exhaustion of its 
subsistence — having been pronounced, from the change of circum- 
stances, impracticable, by Major Anderson, Captain Foster, (Chief 
Engineer,) and all the other officers of the fort, as well as by Brig- 
adier General Totten, Chief of the Corps of Engineers ; and, con- 
curring in that opinion, I did not hesitate to advise, (March 12th) 
that Major Anderson be instructed to evacuate the fort, so long 
gallantly held by him and his companions, immediately on procur- 
ing suitable transportation to take them to New York. His rela- 
tive weakness had steadily increased in the last eighteen days. 

It was not till January 3d (when the first Commissioners from 
South Carolina withdrew) that the permission I had solicited Octo- 
ber 31st was obtained, to admonish commanders of the few South- 
ern forts with garrisons to be on the alert against surprises and 
sudden assaults. (Major Anderson was not among the admonished 
being already straitly beleaguered.) 

January 3d. To Lieut. Slemner, commanding in Pensacola 
Harbor : 

" The General-in-Chief directs that you take measures to do the 
utmost in your pov/er to prevent the seizure of either of the forts 
in Pensacola harbor, by surprise or assault, consulting first with 
the commander of the navy yard, who will probably have received 
instructions to co-oi^erate with you." (This order was signed by 
Aid-de-Camp Lay.) 

It was just before the surrender of the Pensacola navy yard (Jan- 
uary 12) that Lieut. Slemmer, calling upon Com. Armstrong, ob- 



8 GENERAL SCOTT'S LETTERS. 

tained the aid of some thirty common seamen or laborers, (but no 
marines) which, added to his forty-six soldiers, made up his numbers 
to seventy-six men, with whom this meritorious officer has since 
held Fort Pickens, and performed, working night and day, an im- 
mense amount ol labor in mounting guns, keeping up a strong 
guard, &c,, &c. 

Early in January I renewed, as has been seen, my solicitations to 
be allowed to reinforce Fort Pickens, but a good deal of time was 
lost in vacillations. First, the President " thought if no movement 
is made by the United States, Fort McEae will probably not be oc- 
cupied nor Fort Pickens attacked. In case of movements by tlie 
United States, which will doubtless be made known by the wires, 
there will be corresponding local movements, and the attempt to 
reinforce will be useless:^— (Quotation from a note made by Aid-de- 
Camp Lay^ about January 12, o f the President's reply to a message 
from me.) Next, it was doubted whether it would be safe to send 
reinforcements in an unarmed steamer, and the want, as usualj of a 
suitable naval vessel— the Brooklyn being long held in reserve at 
Norfolk for some purpose unknown to me. Finally, after I had 
kept a body of three hundred recruits in New York harbor ready 
for some time— and they would have been sufficient to reinforce 
temporarily Fort Pickens and to occupy Fort McRae also — the 
President, about January 18, permitted that the sloop of war 
Brooklyn should take a single company, ninety men, from Fort 
Monroe, Hampton Roads, and reinforce Lieutenant Slemmer, in Fort 
Pickens, but without a surplus man for the neighboring ibrt, 
McRae. 

The Brooklyn, with Capt. Vodges' company alone, left the 
Chesapeake for Fort Pickens about January 22d, and, on the 29tb, 
President Buchanan, having entered into a quasi armistice with cer- 
tain leading seceders at Pensacola and elsewhere, caused Secretaries 
Holt and Toucey to instruct, in a joint note, the commanders of the 
war vessels, off Pensacola and Lieut. Slemmer, commanding Fort 
Pickens, to commit no act of hostility, and not to land Capt. Vodges' 
company unless that fort should be attacked. * 

[That joint note I never saw until March 25th, but supposed tie 

* It was known nt the Navy Department that the Brooklyn, with Capt. Vogdes on 
board, would be obliged in open sea to stand off and on Fort Pickens, and in rough 
weather might sometimes be fifty miles ofi'. Indeed, if ten miles at sea, the fort miglt 
have been attacked and easily carried before the reinforcement could have reached the 
beach, in open sea, where alone it could land. 



GENERAL SCOTT'S LETTERS. $ 

armistice was consequent upon the meeting of the Peace Convention 
at Washington, and was understood to terminate with it.] 

Hearing however, of the most active preparations for hostilities 
on the part of the seceeders at Pensacola, by the erection of new 
batteries and arming Fort McRae — that had not a gun mounted 
when it was seized — during the Peace Convention and since, I 
brought the subject to the notice of the new Administration, when 
this note, dated March 12th, to Capt. Vogdes was agreed upon, viz : 
"At the first favorable moment 3^011 will land with j-our company, 
reinforce Fort Pickens, and hold the same till further orders." This 
order, in duplicate, left New York by two naval vessels about the 
middle of March, as the mail and the wires could not be trusted, 
and detached officers could not be substituted, for two had already 
?3een arrested and paroled by the authorities at Pensacola, despatches 
taken from one of them, and a third, to escape like treatment, 
forced to turn back when near that city. Thus those authorities 
have not ceased to make war upon the United States since the cap- 
ture by them of the navy ja.rd, January 12th. 

Respectfully submitted. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 

Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, March ZOth 1861. 



In giving the above paper, at the instance of Gen Scott, it may 
not be improper to publish the following letter, referred to as the 
one which has appeared in print without his authority, and which, 
it is asserted in the public papers, the Secretary of State, to whom 
the letter was written, denies any instrumentality in making 
public : 

Washington, March 3, 1861. 

Dear Sir : — Hoping that in a day or two the new President will 
have happil}^ passed through all personal dangers, and find himself 
installed and the honored successor of the great Washington, with 
3-0U as the chief of his Cabinet, I beg leave to repeat, in writing, 
what I liave before said to you orally, this supplement to my printed 
" views," (dated in October last) on the highly disordered condition 
of our (so late) happy and glorious Union. 

To meet the extraordinary exigencies of the times, it seems to 
me that I am guilty of no arrogance in limiting the President's field 
of selection to one of the four plans of proceedure subjoined : 

I. Throw off the old and assume a new designation— the Union 
party : adopt the conciliatory measures proposed by Mr. Critten^ 



10 GENERAL SCOTT'S LETTERS. 

den or the Peace Convention, and my life upon it, we shall have no 
new case of secession ; but, on the contrary, an early return of many 
if not of all the States which have already broken oft" from the Union. 
"Without some equally benign measure, the remaining Slaveholding 
States will probably join the Montgomery Confederacy in less than 
sixty days : when this city, being included in a foreign country, 
would require a permanent garrison of at least thirty-five thousand 
troops to protect the Government within it. 

II. Collect the duties on foreign goods outside the ports of which 
the Government has lost the command, or close such ports by act 
of Congress and blockade them. 

III. Conquer the Seceded States by invading armies. No doubt 
this might be done in two or three years by a young and able Gen- 
eral — a Wolfe, a Dessaix, a Iloche — with three hundred thousand 
disciplined men, estimating a third for garrisons, and the loss of a 
yet greater number by skirmishes, sieges, battles, and Southern 
fevers. The destruction of life and propert}' on the other side 
would be frightful, however perfect the moral discipline of the 
invaders. 

The conquest completed, at that enormous Avaste of human life to 
the North and Northwest, with at least ^250 000 000 added thereto, 
and cut bono ? Fifteen devastated provinces ! not to be brought into 
harmony with their conquerors, but to be held for generations by 
heavy garrisons, at an expense quadruple the nett duties or taxes 
which it would be possible to extort from them, followed by a Pro- 
tector or an Emperor. 

lY. Say to the Seceded States, Wayward sisters, depart in 
peace. 

In haste, I remain, very truly yours. 

WINFIELD SCOTT. 
Hon. William H. Seward, &c.j &c. 



EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S REPLY, 



To the Editors of the National Intelligencer : 

On Wednesday last I received the National Intelligencer contain- 
ing General Scott's address to the public. This is throughout an 
undisguised censure of my conduct during the last months of the 
Administration, in regard to the seven Cotton States, now in rebel- 
lion. From our past relations I was greatly surprised at the ap- 
pearance of such a paper. In one aspect, however, it was highly 
gratifying. It has justified me, nay, it has rendered it absolutely 
necessary, that I should no longer remain silent in respect to charges 
which have been long vaguely circulating, but are now endorsed by 
the responsible name of General Scott. 

I.— The first and most prominent among these charges is my re- 
fusal to immediately garrison nine enumerated fortifications, scatter- 
ed over six of the Southern States, according to the recommenda- 
tion of General Scott, in his " views " addressed to the War De- 
partment on the 29th and 30th of October, 1860. And it has even 
been alleged that if this had been done it might have prevented 
the civil war. 

This refusal is attributed, without the least cause, to the influ- 
ence of Governor Floyd. All my Cabinet must bear me witness 
that I was the President myself, responsible for all the acts of the 
Administration ; and certain it is that during the last six months 
previous to the 29th December, 1860, the day on which he resigned 
his office, after my request, he exercised less influence on the Ad- 
ministration than any other member of the Cabinet. Mr. Holt was 
immediately thereafter transferred from the Post Office Department 
to that of AYar ; so that, from this time until the 4th of March, 
1861, which was by far the most important period of the Adminis- 
tration, he performed the duties of Secretary of War to my entire 
satisfaction. 

But why did I not immediately garrison these nine fortifications 



13 



EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S EEPLY, 



in such a manner, to use the language of General Scott, " as to make 
any attempt to take any one of them by surprise or coup-de-main 
ridiculous ?" There is one answer both easy and conclusive, even if 
other valid reasons did not exist. There were no available troops 
within reach which could be sent to these fortifications. To have 
attempted a military operation on a scale so extensive by any 
means within the President's power would have been simply absurd. 
Of this General Scott himself seems to have been convinced, for on 
the day after the date of his first " views " he addressed (on the 
30th October) sapplemental views to the War Department, in 
which he states : " There is one (regvlar) company in Boston^ one 
here, {at the Narrows,) one at Pittsburgh, one at Augusta, (Ga.,) one 
at Baton Rouge " — in all fioe companies only icithin reach to garrison 
or reinfoi'ce the forts mentioned in the "i'iewv*." 

Five companies — four hundred men — to occupy and reinforce nine 
fortifications in six highly excited Southern States ! The force 
" within reach " was so entirely inadequate that nothing more need 
be said on the subject. To have attempted such a military opera, 
tion with so feeble a force, and the Presidential election impend- 
ing, would have been an invitation to collision and secession. In- 
deed, if the whole American army, consisting then of only sixteen 
thousand men, had been " within reach," they would have been 
scarcely sufficient for this purpose. Such was our want of troops 
that, although General Scott, believing, in opposition to the opinion 
of the Committee raised in the House of Kcpresentatives, that the 
inauguration of Mr. Lincoln might be interrupted by military force, 
was only able to assemble at Washington, so late as the 4th March, 
six hundred and fifty-three men, rank and file of the army ; and, to 
make up this number, even the sappers and miners were brought 
from West Point. 

But why was there no greater force within reach ? This ques- 
tion could be better answered by General Scott himself than by any 
other person. Our small regular army, with the exception of a few 
hundred men, were out of reach, on our remote frontiers, where it 
had been continuously stationed for years, to protect the inhabitants 
and the emigrants on their way thither against the attacks of 
hostile Indians. All were insufficient, and both General Scott and 
myself had endeavored in vain to prevail upon Congress to raise 
several additional regiments for this purpose. In recommending 
this augmentation of the army, the General states in his report to 



EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S REPLY. 15 

the War Department of November, 1857, that " it wouM not more 
than furnish the reinforcements now greatly need in Florida, Texas, 
New Mexico, California, Oregon, Washington (T.) Kansas, Nebraska, 
Minnesota, leaving not a company for Utah." And, again, in his re- 
port of November, 1858, he says: 

" This want of troops to give reasonable security to our citizens 
in distant settlements, including emigrants on the plains, can 
scarcely be too strong'y stated ; but I will only add, that as 'often 
as we have been obliged to withdraw troops from one frontier in 
order to reinforce another, the weakened points have been instantly 
attacked or threatened with formidable invasion." 

These " views" of General Scott exhibit the crude notions then 
prevailing even among inteligent and patriotic men on this subject 
of secession. In the first sentence the General, whilst stating 
that " to save time the right of secession my be conceded," yet im- 
mediately says " this is instantly balanced by the correlative right 
on the part of the Federal Government against an interior State or 
States to re-establish by force, if necessary, its former continuity of 
territory." (For this he cites " Paley's Moral and Political Phil- 
osophy, last chapter." It may be there, but I have been unable to 
find it.) Whilst it is difficult to ascertain his precise meaning in 
this passage, he renders what he did not mean quite clear in his sup- 
plementary " views." In these he says : " It will be seen that the 
' views' only apply to a case of secession that makes a gap in the 
present Union. The falling^ff, say of Texas, or of all the Atlantic 
States, from the^Potomac south, (the very case which has occurred) 
was not within the scope of General S.'s "provisional remedies;" 
that is to say, to establish by force, if neccessary, the continuity of 
our territory. In his ' views' he also states as follows: " But break 
this glorious Union by whatever line or lines that political madness 
may contrive, and there would be no hope of recruiting the frag- 
ments except by the laceration and despotism of the sword. To 
effect such result the intestine wars of our Mexican neighbors would, 
in comparison with ours, sink into mere child's play." In the Gene- 
ral's opinion " a smaller evil (than these intestine wars) would be to 
allow the fragments of the great Republic to form themselves into 
new Confederacies, probably four." He then points out what 
ought to be the boundaries between the new Unions ; and at the 
end of each goes so far as even to indicate the cities which 
ought to be the capitals of the three first on this side of the Rocky 
mountains, to wit, " Columbia, South Carolina," " Alton or Quincy, 



^4 EX-PEESIDENT BUCHANAN'S REPLY. 

Illinois," and " Albany, New York," excluding Washington city al- 
to-ether. This indication of cai itals, contained in the original, now 
in my possession, is curiously omitted in the version published in the 
National Intelligencer. He designates no capital for the fourth 
Union on the Pacific. The reader will judge what encouragement 
these views, proceeding from so distinguished a source, must have 
afforded to the secessionists of the Cotton States. 

I trust I have said enough, and more than enough, to convince 
every mind why I did not, with a force of five companies, attempt to 
reinforce Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi ; Fort 
Morgan, below Mobile ; Forts Pickens and McRae, in Pensacoia 
Harbor ; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah ; Forts Moultrie and Sum- 
ter, Charleston Harbor, and Fort Monroe, in Virginia. 

These " views," both original and supplementary, were published 
by General Scott in the National Intelligencer of January 1861, at 
the most important and critical period of the Administration. Their 
publication, at that time, could do no possible good, and might do 
much harm. To have published them, without the President's 
knowledge and consent, was as much in violation of the sacred con- 
fidence which ouglit to prevail between the commanding General of 
the army and the Commander-in-Chief as it would have been for 
the Secretary of War to publish the same documents without his 
authority. What is of more importance, their publication was cal- 
culated injuriously to affect the compromise measures then pending 
before Congress and the country, and to encourage the secessionists 
in their mad and wicked attempt to shatter the Union into frag- 
ments. From the great respect which I then entertained for the 
General I passed it over in silence. 

It is worthy of remark that soon after the Presidential election^ 
representations of wbat those " views" contained, of more or less 
correctness, were unfortunately circulated, especially throughout the 
South. The Editors of the National Intelligencer, in assigning a 
reason for their publication, state that both in public prints and in 
public speeches, allusions had been made to them, and some misap- 
prehensions of their character had got abroad. 

II. and III General Scott states that he arrived in Washington 
on the 12th, and, accompanied by the Secretary of War, held a con- 
versation with the President on the 15th December. Whilst I have 
no recollection whatever of this conversation, he doubtless states 
correctly that I did refuse to send three hundred men to reinforce 



EX-PEESIDENT BUCHANAN'S EEl'LY. 15> 

Major Anderson at Fort Moultrie, who had not then removed to 
Fort Sumter. The reason for this refusal is manifest to all who 
recollect the history of the time. But twelve days before, in the 
annual message of the 3d December, I had urged upon Congress the 
adoption of amendments to the Constitution of the same character 
with those subsequently proposed by Mr. Crittenden, called the 
" Crittenden Compromise." At that time high hopes were enter- 
tained throughout the country that these would be adopted. Be- 
sides, I believed, and this correctly, as the event proved, that Major 
Anderson was then in no danger of attack. Indeed he and his com- 
mand were then treated with marked kindness by the authorities, 
and people of Charleston. Under these circumstances, to have sent 
such a force there would have been only to impair the hope of com- 
promise, to provoke collision, and disappoint the countr3^ 

There are some details of this conversation in regard to which the 
General's memory must be defective. At present, I shall' specify 
only one. I could not have stated that on a future contingent oc- 
casion I would telegraph " Major Anderson, of Fort Moultrie, to 
hold the Forts (Moultrie and Sumter) against attack ;"' because, 
with prudent precaution, this had already been done several days 
before, through a special messenger, sent to Major Anderson, for this 
very purpose. I refer to Major Buell, of the army. 

The General's supplementar}^ note of the same day, presenting to 
me General Jackson's conduct in 1833, during the period of nullifi- 
cation, as an example, requires no special notice. Even if the cases 
were not entirely different, I had previously determined upon a 
policy of my own, as will appear from my annual message. This 
was, at every hazard to collect the customs at Charleston, and out- 
side of the port, if need be, in a vessel of war. Mr. Colcock, the 
existing collector^ as I had anticipated, resigned his office about the 
end of December, and immediately thereafter I nominated to the 
Senate as his successor, a suitable person prepared at any personal 
risk to do his duty. That body, however, throughout its entire ses- 
sion declined to act on this nomination. Thus, without a collector. 
it was rendered impossible to collect the revenue. 

IV. General Scott's statement alleges that " the Brooklyn, with 
Capt. Vodges's company alone, left the Chesapeake for Fort Pickens 
about January 22d, and on the 29th President Buchanan, having 
entered into a quasi armistice with certain leadmg seceders at Pen- 
sacola and elsewhese, caused Secretaries Holt and Toucey to instruct, 



18 EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S REPLY. 

in A joint note, the commander of the war vessels off Pensacola, and 
Lieut. Slemmer, commanding Fort Pickens, to commit no act of 
hostility, and not to land Capt. Vogdes's company unless the Fort 
should be attacked." He afterwards states, within brackets, " That 
joint note I never saw, but suppose the armistice was consequent 
upon the meeting of the Peace Convention at Washington, and was 
understood to termin..te with it." 

These statements betray a singular want of memory on the part 
of General Scott. It is scarcely credible that this very joint note, 
presented in such odious colors, was submitted to General Scott on 
the day it was prepared, (29th January,) and met his entire appro- 
bation. I would not venture to make this assertion if I did not pos- 
sess conclusive evidence to prove it. On that day Secretary Holt 
addressed me a note, from which the following is an extract : " I 
have the satisfaction of saying^ that on mhmittivg the paper to General 
Scott, he expressed himself satisfied loith it, saying that there could he no 
objection to the arrangement in a military pioint of view, or othencise.^'' 
This requires no comment. That the General had every reason to 
be satisfied with the arrangement, will appear from the following 
statement : 

A revolutionary outbreak had occurred in Florida; the troops of 
the United States had been expelled from Pensacola and the adja- 
cent navy yard ; and Lieutenant Slemmer, of the artillery, with his 
brave little command, had been forced to take refuge in Fort Pick- 
ens, where he was in imminent danger every m.oment of being cap- 
tured by a vastly superior force. Owing to the interruption of reg- 
ular communications Secretary Holt did not receive information of 
these events until several days after their occurrence, and then 
through a letter addressed to a third person. He instantly inform- 
the President of the fact, and reinforcements, provisions, and mili- 
tary stores were dispatched by the Brooklyn to Fort Pickens with- 
out a moment's unnecessary delay. She left Fortress Monroe on 
the 24th of January. 

Well-founded apprehensions were, however, entertained at the 
time of her departure that the reinforcements, with the vessels of 
war at no great distance from Fort Pickens, could not arrive in time 
to defend it against the impending attack. In this state of sus- 
pense, and whilst Lieutenant Slemmer was in extreme peril^ Sena, 
tors Slidell, Hunter, and Bigler, received a telegraphic despatch 
from Senator Mallorv, of Florida, dated at Pensacola, on the 28th 



EX-PKESIDENT BUCHANAN'S llErLY. 17 

January, witli the urgent request that thcj- should lay it before the 
President. This despatch expressed an earnest desire to maintain 
the peace, as well as the most positive assurance that no attack 
would be made on Fort Pickens if the present status should be pre- 
served. This proposal was carefully considered, both with a view 
to the safety of the fort, and to the unhappy effect which an actual 
collision either at that or an)^ other point might produce on the 
Peace Convention then about to assemble at Washington. The re- 
sult was that a joint despatch was carefully prepared by the Secre- 
taries of War and Navy, accepting the proposal, with important 
modifications, which was transmitted by telegraph on the 29th, 
Januar}^ to Lieutenant Slemmer, and to the naval commanders near 
the station. It is too long for transcription ; suffice it to say it 
was carefully guarded at every point for the security of the fort 
and its free communication with Washington. 

The result was highly fortunate. The Brooklyn had a long pas- 
sage. Although she left Fortress ]Monroe on the 24th January, she 
did not arrive at Pensacola until the 6th February. In the mean 
time. Fort Pickens, with Lieut. Slemmer, (whose conduct deserves 
high commendation,) and bis brave little band, were placed, by 
virtue of this arrangement, in periect security until an adequate 
force had arrived to defend it against any attack. The fort is still 
in our possession. Well might Gen. Scott have expressed his sat- 
isfaction with this arrangement. The General was correct in the 
supposition that this arrangement was to expire on the termination 
of the Peace Convention. 

V. But we now come to an important period, when dates will be 
essentially necessary to disentangle the statement of Gen. Scott. 
The South Carolina Commissioners were appointed on the 22d, and 
arrived in Washington on the 27th December. The day after their 
arrival it was announced that Major Anderson had removed from 
Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter. This rendered them furious. On 
the same day they addressed an angry letter to the President de- 
manding the surrender of Fort Sumter. The President answered 
this letter on the 30th December by a peremptory refusal. This 
brought forth a reply from the Commissioners on the 2d Januar}^, 
1861, of such an insulting character that the President instantly 
returned it to them with the following endorsement : " This paper, 
just presented to the President, is of such a character that he de- 
clines to receive it." From that time forward all friendly, political, 



18 EX-PRESIDENT EUCIIAXAN'S EEPLY. 

nnd personal intercourse finally ceased between the revolutionary 
Senators and the President, and he was severely attacked by them 
in the Senate, and especially by Mr. Jefferson Davis. Indeed, their 
intercourse had previously been of the coldest character ever since 
the President's anti-secession message at the commencement of the 
session of Congress. 

Under these changed circumstances, Gen. Scott, by note on Sun- 
day, the 30th December, addressed the following inquiry to the 
President : 

" Will the President permit Gen. Scott, without reference to the 
War Department, and otherwise as secretly as possible, to send two 
hundred and fifty recruits from New York harbor to reinforce Fort 
Sumter, together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition, 
and subsistence ? It is hoped that a sloop of war and cutter may 
be ordered for the same purpose to-morrow." 

The General seems not to have then knov/n that Mr. Floyd was 
out of office. 

Never did a request meet a more prompt compliance. It was 
received on Sunday evening, December 30th. On Monday morning 
I gave instructions to the War and Navy Departments, and on 
Monday evening Gen. Scott came to congratulate mc that the 
Secretaries had issued the necessary orders to the army and navy 
officers, and that they were in his possession. The Brooklyn, with 
troops, military stores, and provisions, was to sail forthwith from 
Fortress Monroe for Fort Sumter. I am therefore utterly at a loss 
to imagine why the General, in his statement, should have asserted 
that " the South Carolina Commissioners had already been many 
da3^s in Washington and no movement of defence (on tlje part of 
the United States) was perm.itted." These Commissioners arrived 
in Washington on the 27th December ; Gen. Scott's request was 
made to tlie President on the SOth. It was complied with on the 
31st, and a single day is all that represents the •' many days " of the 
General. 

Again, General Scott asserts, in the face of these facts, that the 
President refused to allow any attempt to be made — to reinforce 
Fort Sumter — because he was holding negotiations with the South 
Carolina Commissioners. And still again, that " afterwards Secre- 
tary Holt and myself endeavored, in vain, to obtain a ship-of-A\ ar 
for the purpose, and were finally obliged to employ the passenger 
steamer ' Star of the W^est.' " Will it be believed that the substi- 



EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S REPLY. 19 

tution of the '•' Star of the ^\'est," for the powerful steamer Brooklyn, 
of which he now complains, was by the advice of Gen. Scott him- 
self ? I have never heard this doubted until I read the statement. 
At the interview already referred to between the General and 
myself, on the evening of Monday the 31st of December, I suggested 
to him that, although I had not received the South Carolina Com- 
missioners in their official capacity, but merely as private gentlemen, 
yet it might be considered an improper act to send the Brooklyn 
with reinforcements to Fort Sumter until I had received an 
answer from them to my letter of the preceding day ; that the de- 
lay could not continue more than forty-eight hours. He prom.ptly 
concurred in this suggestion as gentlemanly and proper, and the 
orders were not transmitted to the Brooklyn on that evening. My 
anticipations were correct, for on the morning of the 2d of January 
1 received their insolent note, and sent it back to them. In the 
mean time, however, the General had become convinced, by the 
representations of a gentleman whom I forbear to name, that the 
better plan, as the Secretaries of War and the Navy informed me, 
to secure secrec}^ and success and reach the fort, would be to send a 
fast, side-wheel, mercantile steamer from New York with the 
reinforcement. Accordinglv the " Star of the "West" was selected 
for this duty. The substitution of this mercantile steamer for the 
Brooklyn, which would have been able to defend herself iu case of 
attack, was reluctantly yielded by me to the high military judgment 
of General Scott. 

The change of programme required a brief space of time ; but the 
" Star of the AYest" left New York for Charleston on the evening of 
the 5th of January. On the very day, however, when this ill-fated 
steamer left N av York, a telegram was despatched by Gen. Scott 
to Col. Scott to countermand her departure ; but it did not reach 
its destination until after she had gone to sea. The reason for this 
countermand shall be stated in the language of Secretary Holt, to 
be found in a letter addressed by him to Mr. Thompson, the late 
Secretary of the Interior on the 5th of March, 1861, and published 
in the National Intelligencer. Mr. Holt says : 

" The countermand spoken of (by Mr. Thompson) was not more 
cordially sanctioned by the President than it was by General Scott 
and myself; not because of any dissent (rom the order on the part 
of the President, but because of a letter received that day from 
Major xinderson, stating, in effect, that he regarded himself secure 
in his position ; and yet more from intelligence w^hich late on Sat- 



20 EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S REPLY. 

iirday evening (5tli Januaiy, 18G1) readied the Department, that a 
heav}^ ])atterY Imd been erected among the sand hills at the entrance 
to Charleston Harbor, which wonld probably destroy any unarmed 
vessel (and such was the " Star of the West'") which might attempt 
to make its way to Fort Sumter. This important information sat- 
isfied the Government that there was no pre.-ent necessity for send- 
ing reinforcements, and that when sent they should go, not in a 
vessel of commerce, but of war. Hence the countermand was 
despatched by telegraph to New York ; but the vessel had sailed a 
short time before it reached the officer (Col. Scott) to whom it was 
addressed." 

A statement of these facts, established b}^ dates, proves con- 
•clusively that the President was not only willing but anxious in 
the bi-iefest period to reinforce Fort Sumter. 

On the 4th January, the day before the departure of the Star of 
the West from New York, as General Scott in his statement ad- 
mits, succor was sent to Fort Taylor, Key West, and to Fort Jeffer- 
son, Tortugas Island, which reached these points in time for their 
security. He nevertheless speculates on the consequences which 
might have followed had the reinforcements not reached their des- 
tination in due time, and even expresses the extraordinary opinion 
that, with the possession of these Forts, " the rebels might have 
purchased an early recognition," 

I shall next advert to the statement that the expedition under 
Captain Ward, " of three or four small steamers belonging to the 
Coast Survey," was kept back by something like a truce or arm- 
stice, [made here], embracing Charleston and Pensacola harbors, 
agreed upon between the late President and certain principal sece- 
ders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, &c. "And this truce 
lasted to the end of the Administration.' Things altogether dis- 
tinct in their nature are so often blended in this statement that it 
is difficult to separate them. Such is eminently the case in con- 
necting the facts relative to Charleston with Pensacola. 

Having already treated of the charge of having kept back rein- 
forcements from Pensacola, I shall now say something of the cliaro-e 
of having also kept them back from Cliarleston. Neither a truce, 
nor quasi truce, nor anything like it, was ever concluded between 
the President and any human authority concerning Charleston. On 
the contrary, the South Carolina Commissioners, first and last, and 
all the time, were informed that the President could never surreu- 
<ler Fort Sumter, nor deprive himself of the most entire liberty to 
-send reinforcements to it whenever it was believed to be in danger 



EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S llEI'LY. 21 

or requested by Major Anderson. It is strange that General Scott 
wiis not apprised of this well-known fact. It was then, with some- 
astonishment, that I learned from the statement of the General 
that he had, on the 12th March, 1861, advised that Major Ander- 
son should be instructed to evacuate the fort as soon as suitable 
transportation could be procured to carry himself and his command 
to New York. A military necessity for a capitulation may have 
existed in case there should be an attack upon the fort, or a de- 
mand for its surrender ; but surely none such could have existed 
for its voluntary surrender and abandonment. 

Probably that to which the General means to refer was not the 
quasi, but the actual truce of arms concluded at Charleston on the 
11th January, 1861, betvreen Governor Pickens and Major Ander- 
son, without the knowledge of the President. It was on the 9th of 
January that the Star of the West, under the American flag, was 
fired upon in the harbor of Charleston, by order of Governor Pick- 
ens. Immediately after this outrage^ Major Anderson sent a flag to 
the Governor, stating that he presumed the act had been unauthor- 
ized, and for that reason he had not opened fire from Fort Sumter 
on the adjacent batteries ; but demanding its disavowal, and, if this 
were not sent in a reasonable time, he would consider it war, and 
fire on any vessel that attempted to leave the harbor. Two days 
after this occurrence, on the 11th January, Governor Pickens had 
the audacity to demand of Major Anderson the surrender of the 
fort. In his answer of the same date the Major made the following 
proposition : " Should your Excellency deem fit, previous to a 
resort to arms, to refer this matter to Washington, it would afford 
me the sincerest pleasure to depute one of my oflRcers to accompany 
any messenger you may deem proper to be the bearer of your de- 
mand." This proposition was promptly accepted by the Governor, 
and, in pursuance thereof, he sent on his part, Hon. J. W. Hayne, 
the Attorney General of South Carolina, to Washington, whilst 
Major Anderson deputed Lieut. Hall, of the United States Army, to 
accompany him. These gentlemen arrived together in Washington 
on the evening of the 13th of January, when the President obtained 
the first knowledge of the transaction. But it will be recollected 
that no time intervened between the return of the Star of the West 
to New York and the arrival of the messenger bearing a copy of the 
truce at Washington, within which it would have been possible to 



22 EX-rRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S REPLY. 

send reinforcements to Fort Sumter. Both events occurred about 
the same time. 

Thus, a truce or suspension of arms was concluded between the par- 
ties, to continue until the question of the surrender of the fort should 
be decided by the President. Until this decision Major Anderson had 
placed it out of his own power to ask for reinforcements, and equallj^ 
out of the power of the Government to send them without a viola- 
tion of public faith. This was what writers on public law denomi- 
nate " a partial truce under which hostilities are suspended only in 
certain places, as between a town and the army besieging it." It 
is possible that the President, under the laws of war, might have 
annulled this truce upon due notice to the opposite party ; but nei- 
ther Gen. Scott nor any other person ever suggested this expedient. 
This would have been to cast a reflection on Major Anderson, who, 
beyond question, acted from the highest and purest motives. Did 
Gen. Scott ever propose to violate this truce during its existence ? 
If he did, I am not now, and never was, aware of the fact. Indeed 
I think he would have been one of the last men in the world to pro- 
pose such a measure. 

Col. Hayne did not deliver the letter which he bore from Gov- 
ernor Pickens, demanding the surrender of the fort, to the Presi- 
dent until the 31st of January. The documents containing the 
reasons for this worrying delay were communicated to Congress in 
a special message of the 8th of February, to which I refer the 
reader. On the 5th of February the Secretary of War, under the 
instructions of the President, gave a peremptory refusal to this de- 
mand in an able and comprehensive letter, reviewing the whole 
subject, explaining and justifying the conduct of the President 
throughout. Its concluding sentence is both eloquent and emphatic: 

" If (says ;Mr. Holt,) with all the multiplied proofs which exist 
of the President's anxiety for peace, and of the earnestness with 
which he has pursued it, the authorities of that State shall assault 
Fort Sumter and imperil the lives of the handful of brave and loyal 
men shut up within its walls, and thus plunge our country into the 
horrors of civil war, then upon them and those they represent must 
rest tlie responsibility." 

The truce wa« then ended, and General Scott is incorrect in stating 
" that it lasted to the end of that Administration." 

An expedition was quietly fitted out at New York, under the 
supervision of General Scott, to be ready for any contingency. Ho 
arranged its details, and regarded the reinforcements thus provided 



EX-niESIDENT BUCIIA-NAN'S llEPLY. 28 

for as sufficient. This was read}^ to sail for Fort Sumter on five 
hours' notice. It is of tliis expedition that Gen. Scott thus speaks : 

" At that time, when this (the truce) had passed away, Secretaries 
Holt and Toucey, Capt. Ward, of the nav3'-, and myself, with the 
knowledge of the President, settled upon the employment, under 
the Captain, of three or four steamers belonging to the Coast 
Survey, but he was kept back by the truce." 

A strange inconsistency. The truce had expired with Mr. Holt's 
letter to Col. Hayne on the 5th of February, and Gen. Scott in his 
statement says " it would have been eas}'- to reinforce this fort down 
to about the 12th of Februar}^." Why, then, did not the reinforce- 
ments proceed ? This was simply because of communications from 
Major Anderson. It was most fortunate that they did not proceed ; 
because the three or four small steamers which were to bear them 
would never have reached the fort, and in the attempt must have 
been captured or destroyed. The vast inadequacy of the force pro- 
vided to accomplish the object was demonstrated by information 
received from Major Anderson at the War Department on the last 
day ©f the Administriition. 

I purposely forbear at present to say more on this subject, lest I 
might, however unintentionally, do injustice to one or more of the 
parties concerned, in consequence of the brevity required by the 
nature of this communication. The facts relating to it, with the 
appropriate accompaniments, have been fully presented in a histori- 
cal review, prepared a year ago, which will ere long be published. 
This review contains a sketch of the four last months of my Admin- 
istration. It is impartial ; at least such is my honest conviction. 
That it has not yet been published has arisen solely from an appre- 
hension, no longer entertained, that something therein might be 
unjustly perverted into an interference with the Government in a 
vigorous prosecution of the war for the maintenance of the Consti- 
tution and the restoration of the Union, which was far, very far, 
from my intention. 

After a careful retrospect, I can solemnly declare before God and 
my country that I cannot reproach myself with any act of commis- 
sion or omission since the existing troubles commenced. I have 
never doubted that mj countrymen would yet do me justice. In 
my special message of the 8th of January, 18G1, I presented a full 
and fair exposition of the alarming condition of the country, and 
urged Congress either to adopt measures of compromise, or, failing 



24 EX-rPxESIDENT BUCHANATs^'S REPLY. 

in this, to prepare for the last alternative. In both aspects my 
recommendation was disregarded. I shall close this document with 
a quotation of the last sentences of that message, as follows : 

" In conclusion it may be permitted me to remark that I have 
often warned my countrymen of the dangers which now surround 
us. This may be the last time I shall refer to the subject officially. 
I feel that m.y duty has been faithfully, though it may be imper- 
fectly, performed { and whatever the result may be, I shall carry to 
my grave the consciousness that I at least meant well for my 
country."' 

Your obedient servant, 

JAMES BUCHANAN. 

Wheatland, near Lancaster, October 28, 1862. 



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